It's worse than you thought : the feedback negativity and violations of reward prediction in gambling tasks by Hajcak, Greg et al.
It’s worse than you thought: The feedback negativity and
violations of reward prediction in gambling tasks
GREG HAJCAK,a,n JASON S. MOSER,b,n CLAY B. HOLROYD,c and ROBERT F. SIMONSb
aDepartment of Psychology, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, New York, USA
bDepartment of Psychology, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware, USA
cDepartment of Psychology, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada
Abstract
The reinforcement learning theory suggests that the feedback negativity should be larger when feedback is unexpected.
Two recent studies found, however, that the feedback negativity was unaffected by outcome probability. To further
examine this issue, participants in the present studies made reward predictions on each trial of a gambling task where
objective reward probability was indicated by a cue. In Study 1, participants made reward predictions following the
cue, but prior to their gambling choice; in Study 2, predictions were made following their gambling choice. Predicted
and unpredicted outcomes were associated with equivalent feedback negativities in Study 1. In Study 2, however, the
feedback negativity was larger for unpredicted outcomes. These data suggest that the magnitude of the feedback
negativity is sensitive to violations of reward prediction, but that this effect may depend on the close coupling of
prediction and outcome.
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Event-related brain potential (ERP) studies have consistently
reported the presence of a medial frontal negative deﬂection
peaking at approximately 250 ms when participants receive neg-
ative compared to positive performance feedback (Holroyd &
Coles, 2002; Luu, Tucker, Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003;
Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2002; Ruchsow, Grothe, Spitzer, & Kiefer, 2002). A similar
feedback negativity has been reported following the presentation
of stimuli indicating monetary loss or nonreward compared to
reward (Gehring &Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser,
& Simons, 2005; Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006;
Holroyd, Hajcak, & Larsen, 2006; Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen,
2005; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). In fact, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung,
Holroyd, Schurger, and Cohen (2004) found that a feedback
negativity could be elicited by either monetary or performance
information when feedback conveyed information about both
dimensions simultaneously; the aspect of the feedback that elic-
ited the feedback negativity was determined by the aspect of the
feedback that was emphasized. Nieuwenhuis et al. argued that
monetary losses and negative performance feedback are func-
tionally equivalent insofar as both reﬂect outcomes along a
good–bad dimension. In terms of the neural generator of the
feedback negativity, studies that utilize source-localization sug-
gest that the feedback negativity is generated near the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Miltner,
Braun, & Coles, 1997; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, et al., 2004); con-
sistent results implicating the ACC in processing negative feed-
back have been reported using fMRI (Nieuwenhuis, Heslenfeld,
et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis, Schweizer, Mars, Botvinick, &
Hajcak, 2007).
Holroyd and Coles (2002) have argued that the feedback
negativity reﬂects the activity of a reinforcement learning system.
This reinforcement learning theory is predicated on animal re-
search that implicates the basal ganglia and the midbrain dopa-
mine system in reward prediction and reinforcement learning. In
particular, this research indicates that when events are better or
worse than anticipated, the basal ganglia induce a phasic increase
or decrease, respectively, in the activity of midbrain dopamine
neurons (Barto, 1995; Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996;
Schultz, 2002). The reinforcement learning theory proposes that
the amplitude of the feedback negativity is determined by the
impact of this phasic dopamine signal on the ACC (Holroyd &
Coles, 2002), such that unexpected negative feedback is associ-
ated with a large negativity and unexpected positive feedback is
associated with a small negativity.
Recent studies have tested the reinforcement learning theory’s
contention that the feedback negativity reﬂects a reward predic-
tion error signal. For instance, evidence consistent with the re-
inforcement learning theory has been reported in studies where
participants were required to learn stimulus–response mappings
based on feedback; on some trials, participants received feedback
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that was inconsistent with learned stimulus–response mappings.
In these studies, unexpected negative compared to positive feed-
back has been found to elicit the largest feedback negativity
(Gibson, Krigolson, & Holroyd, 2006; Holroyd & Coles, 2002;
Nieuwenhuis, Nielen, Mol, Hajcak, & Veltman, 2005; Nieu-
wenhuis et al., 2002). Additionally, Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Ye-
ung, and Cohen (2003) manipulated feedback frequency in a
gambling task to induce expectations regarding feedback valence
and found that the feedback negativity was larger when mon-
etary losses were infrequent.
A recent study by Hajcak et al. (2005), however, failed to ﬁnd
an inﬂuence of reward probability on the magnitude of the feed-
back negativity in a gambling task. Participants in Experiment 1
of the Hajcak et al. study performed a gambling task in which
they chose one from among four doors following a cue that in-
dicated the probability of reward on each trial (25%, 50%, or
75%). Based on the reinforcement learning theory, we predicted
that the feedback negativity would be largest for nonrewarding
feedback delivered on the 75% trials because such occurrences
should violate subjects’ expectations set by the predictive cue.
Results revealed that the magnitude of the feedback negativity
elicited by nonrewarding feedback was, in fact, the same across
all levels of probability, suggesting that the feedback negativity is
insensitive to objective reward probability. There are, however,
potential methodological reasons why this study yielded results
that were not supportive of the reinforcement learning theory
and contrasted with ﬁndings from previous reinforcement learn-
ing studies.
Most previous feedback negativity studies that did ﬁnd effects
of expectancy (Gibson et al., 2006; Holroyd & Coles, 2002;
Nieuwenhuis, Nielen, et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002) em-
ployed reinforcement learning tasks in which subjects were re-
quired to learn the probability of reward throughout the
experiment, and the learning process may have induced greater
attentional engagement and kept reward expectations closely
linked to the actual reward probability on each trial. Possibly, the
Hajcak et al. (2005) participants developed expectations that
were only loosely tied to the probability of reward indicated by
the predictive cue. Although the success of the experimental ma-
nipulation was supported by self-report following the experi-
mentFparticipants indicated that they received the most
rewards when the cue indicated that a reward was probable
and the fewest rewards when the cue indicated that a reward was
improbableFthese self-reports were retrospective and global
(see also Baker, Krigolson, & Holroyd, 2006). Thus, on a trial-
by-trial basis, participants’ expectations might have been incon-
sistent with the predictive cue or not particularly strong. The
distinction being drawn here between reinforcement learning
tasks that may involve a strong coupling between subjective ex-
pectations and reward probability on the one hand, and gam-
bling tasks that may involve a relatively more loose coupling of
subjective expectations and reward probability on the other, is
similar to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) suggestion that there
exist ‘‘passive’’ or automatic expectations built up through ex-
perience (e.g., during a reinforcement learning task) that are
stronger and differ frommore ‘‘conscious anticipations’’ that are
subject to doubt and reconsideration (e.g., during a gambling
task). After receiving nonrewards on two or three trials in a row
in the gambling task, for example, participants may have suc-
cumbed to the ‘‘gambler’s fallacy’’ and expected a reward even if
the chance of reward was objectively low (25%). Or, it is possible
that despite the retrospective reports of differential expectations,
these expectations were relatively uniform or weak across the
three levels of predictive cue: Participants may have expected
rewards on 50%, 55%, and 60% of the trials, even though the
probability of reward was 25%, 50%, and 75%, respectively.
To further examine the sensitivity of the feedback negativity
to expectancy violations, participants in the current experiments
performed a gambling task similar to that used in the Hajcak
et al. (2005) study in which the odds of reward and nonreward
were manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis via a predictive cue.
Going beyond previous gambling studies, however, participants
were asked to indicate prospectively whether they believed they
would receive a reward on each trial. Thus, we were able to
explicitly examine feedback negativity magnitude elicited by pre-
dicted and unpredicted outcomes as determined by the partic-
ipants on a trial-by-trial basis and could therefore provide amore
directmeasure of the inﬂuence of expectancy on themagnitude of
the feedback negativity. We expected this design to control for
any inconsistencies between objective probability indicated by
the predictive cue and subjective expectations developed through
the course of the task, as we obtained subjects’ own predictions
on a trial-by-trial basis. If the feedback negativity reﬂects a re-
ward prediction error, as Holroyd andColes (2002) suggest, then
unpredicted nonrewards should elicit a larger feedback negativity
compared to predicted nonrewards.
We also evaluated the effect of prediction on the P3, as it has
been shown to be sensitive to expectancies in numerous studies
(Courchesne,Hillyard, &Courchesne, 1977; Duncan-Johnson&
Donchin, 1977; Johnson & Donchin, 1980). It was, therefore,
hypothesized that unpredicted outcomes would elicit larger P3s
than predicted outcomes and would allow us to examine the
effects of prediction on multiple stages of feedback processing.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Seventeen undergraduate students (8 women) in an upper-level
psychology class at the University of Delaware participated in
the current experiment for extra credit. Additionally, partici-
pants were told that they could earn between $0.00 and $24.00 in
bonus money based on their performance. All participants were
paid $12.00.
Task
The task was administered on a Pentium III class computer,
using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.) to
control the presentation and timing of all stimuli. Subjects’ pri-
mary objective on each trial was to guess which of four doors
presented horizontally in a color graphic hid a prize by pressing
the left or right ‘‘ctrl’’ or ‘‘alt’’ key. At the beginning of each trial,
a white ‘‘1,’’ ‘‘2,’’ or ‘‘3’’ appeared on the screen for 1000 ms to
inform the participants how many doors contained prizes; there-
fore, ‘‘1,’’ ‘‘2,’’ and ‘‘3’’ cues indicated that the probability of
reward on the upcoming trial was .25, .50, and .75, respectively.
One and a half seconds after the offset of the cue, the question:
‘‘Do you think youwill win on this trial?’’ appeared on the screen
and remained there until participants indicated yes or no using
the left and right ‘‘ctrl’’ and ‘‘alt’’ keys. Thus, participants were
ﬁrst presented with a cue that conveyed the objective probability
of reward on the upcoming trial; then, participants predicted
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whether or not they thought they would choose correctly. Im-
mediately following their subjective prediction, the graphic of the
doors appeared until the participant chose a door. Five hundred
milliseconds following their choice, a feedback stimulus appeared
on the screen for 1000 ms: a green ‘‘1’’ feedback indicated a
correct guess, and a green ‘‘o’’ feedback indicated an incorrect
guess. All other stimuli were presented in white font against
a black background; all stimuli were positioned in the center of
the screen. The cue and feedback stimuli occupied approximately
21 of visual angle horizontally, and 21 vertically. A ﬁxation
mark (1) was presented in the intertrial interval. The interval
between offset of the feedback stimulus and the following cuewas
1000 ms.
Participants were informed that they would earn $.05 for each
correct guess. Unbeknownst to the participants, the outcome of
each trial was predetermined and pseudorandom such that over-
all the participants received exactly 50% correct feedback; neg-
ative feedback was delivered on 75% of 1-cue trials, 50% of
2-cue trials, and 25% of 3-cue trials.
Procedure
After a brief description of the experiment, EEG sensors were
attached and the participant was given detailed task instructions.
To familiarize participants with the task, each was given a prac-
tice block consisting of 40 trials andwas instructed to guess which
door hid a prize. The experiment consisted of 12 blocks of 40
trials (480 total trials) with each block initiated by the partici-
pant. The experimenter entered the room every 160 trials to in-
form the participant how much money he or she had earned.
Because all participants received the same number of rewarding
and nonrewarding feedback, all participants were paid a uniform
amount for their participation.
Psychophysiological Recording, Data Reduction, and Analysis
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded using a Neuro-
soft Quik-Cap. Recordings were taken from three locations
along the midline: Frontal (Fz), Central (Cz), and Parietal (Pz).
In addition,Med-Associates tin electrodes were placed on the left
and right mastoids (A1 and A2, respectively). During the re-
cording, all activity was referenced to Cz. The electrooculogram
(EOG) generated from blinks and vertical eye movements was
also recorded using Med-Associates miniature electrodes placed
approximately 1 cm above and below the participant’s right eye.
The right earlobe served as a ground site. All EEG/EOG elec-
trode impedances were below 10 kO, and the data from all chan-
nels were recorded by a Grass Model 7D polygraph with Grass
Model 7P1F preampliﬁers (bandpass5 0.05–35 Hz).
All bioelectric signals were digitized on a laboratory micro-
computer using VPM software (Cook, 1999). The EEG was
sampled at 200 Hz. Data collection began with the participants’
response (500 ms prior to feedback), and continued for 1500 ms.
Off-line, the EEG for each trial was corrected for vertical EOG
artifacts using the method developed by Gratton, Coles, and
Donchin (1983; Miller, Gratton, & Yee, 1988) and then re-ref-
erenced to the average activity of the mastoid electrodes. Trials
were rejected and not counted in subsequent analysis if there was
excessive physiological artifact (i.e., 25 ms of invariant analog
data on any channel or A/D values on any channel that equaled
that converters minimum or maximum values). Single-trial EEG
data were lowpass ﬁltered at 20 Hz with a 19 weight FIR digital
ﬁlter as per Cook and Miller (1992).
As the primary aim of the current study was to evaluate the
effect of the participant’s predictions on the feedback-locked
ERPs, grand average waveforms were created for predicted and
unpredicted nonrewards and predicted and unpredicted rewards,
collapsed across the objective probability factor (i.e., 1-cue,
2-cue, and 3-cue trials). The average activity in the 200-ms pre-
stimulus window served as a baseline. One outstanding issue
in feedback negativity (FN) research is whether variance in
FN amplitude between rewarding and nonrewarding feedback
results mainly from activity elicited by nonrewards, by rewards,
or by both. As argued at length by Luck (2005), the absolute
amplitudes of ERP components are meaningless in and of
themselves because, for example, an apparent decrease in the
amplitude of a component can result from the superposition
of a component with opposite polarity (see his rule #4, p. 56).
For these reasons, we have used a difference-wave approach to
isolate the valence-related variance in the ERP in a manner
that is independent of the source of the variance (nonrewards,
rewards, or both; Holroyd, 2004; Luck, 2005). Speciﬁcally,
difference waves were created by subtracting the ERPs observed
following rewards from the ERPs observed following nonre-
wards. These difference waves were created separately based on
the predictions made by participants: predicted (predicted non-
rewards minus predicted rewards feedback) and unpredicted
(unpredicted nonrewards minus unpredicted rewards feedback).
FNs were then deﬁned as the maximum negative amplitude of
these difference waves within a window between 200 and 500 ms
following feedback at each electrode site. This procedure con-
trolled for the main effect of stimulus probability and prediction
on the ERP, ensuring that the ERP measure was sensitive to
the interaction of feedback expectations and valence (Holroyd,
2004).
The P3 was evaluated for each outcome and prediction at all
sites. The P3 was deﬁned as the most positive peak in the 200–
600-ms window following feedback onset. The FN and P3 were
statistically evaluated using SPSS (version 13.1) General Linear
Model software with the Greenhouse–Geisser correction applied
to p values associated with multiple df repeated measures com-
parisons.
Results
Behavioral Results
On average, participants predicted that they would receive a
reward on 15.81% (SD5 18.63), 73.93% (SD5 22.31), and
94.67% (SD5 6.63) of 1-, 2-, and 3-cue trials, respectively. An
ANOVA on number of predicted rewards at each level of cue
conﬁrmed the impression that the cue inﬂuenced participants’
predictions, F(2,32)5 91.52, po.001. Post hoc analyses indicat-
ed that participants predicted rewards on more 3-cue trials
than both 2- and 1-cue trials, t(16)5 3.84, po.01 and
t(16)5 13.85, po.001, respectively; additionally, rewards were
predicted more on 2- than 1-cue trials, t(16)5 8.39, po.001.
Thus, the behavioral data established that the predictive cue
inﬂuenced participants’ predictions regarding the subsequent
feedback. It is interesting to note the presence of a general
positive bias: Participants predicted rewards on more than 50%
of 2-cue trials, t(16)5 4.42, po.001, and more than 75% of
3-cue trials, t(16)5 12.23, po.001; on the other hand, reward
prediction on 1-cue trials did not differ reliably from 25%,
t(16)5 2.03, p4.05.
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The FN
Figure 1 presents feedback-locked ERP averages for rewarding
and nonrewarding feedback for predicted (left) and unpredicted
(right) outcomes at Fz (top), Cz (middle), and Pz (bottom).
Nonrewards were associated with a frontally maximal negative-
going deﬂection that peaked approximately 300 ms following
feedback. Figure 1 also presents the difference wave obtained by
subtracting reward from nonreward for predicted and unpre-
dicted outcomes (predicted nonreward minus predicted reward
and unpredicted nonreward minus unpredicted reward) at Fz
(top), Cz (middle), and Pz (bottom), and Table 1 presents the
average FN amplitudes at each recording site. A 3 (Location) 2
(Prediction) repeated measures ANOVA indicated a trend to-
ward larger FNs at frontal-central recording sites, F(2,32)5
2.91, po.09. Additionally, the FN on predicted and unpredicted
feedback did not differ, F(1,16)o1, and the interaction between
location and prediction did not reach signiﬁcance, F(2,32)o1.1
Based on the behavioral data, it appeared that the strength of
subjects’ predictions varied considerably with the predictive cue.
To further characterize the effect of prediction on FNmagnitude,
then, we conducted a 2 (Prediction: predicted vs. unpredicted)
2 (Prediction Strength: strong vs. weak) ANOVA on a subset of
the data. This follow-up analysis only included 11 participants
because the other 6 did not have the appropriate minimum
number of trials for ERP analysis (20) in the weak prediction
condition. For weak predictions, the predicted and unpredicted
difference waves were calculated by subtracting rewards from
nonrewards on 2-cue trials. For strong predictions, the predicted
difference wave was calculated by subtracting predicted rewards
on 3-cue trials from predicted nonrewards on 1-cue trials; the
unpredicted difference wave was calculated by subtracting un-
predicted rewards on 1-cue trials from unpredicted nonrewards
on 3-cue trials.We conducted the analysis in this manner because
the number of predicted rewards on 1-cue trials and predicted
nonrewards on 3-cue trials were insufﬁcient to yield stable wave-
forms. The analysis, conducted at Cz, where the FN was nu-
merically largest, indicated that the FN did not vary with respect
to prediction, F(1,10)o1, or prediction strength,F(1,10)o1, and
prediction strength did not interact with prediction, F(1,10)o1.
Thus, the magnitude of the FN was insensitive to predictions
when they were both strong (M5  8.05, SD5 4.06 and M5
 8.52, SD5 5.52 for predicted vs. unpredicted outcomes, re-
spectively) and weak (M5  6.37, SD5 5.40 and M5  6.09,
SD5 3.83 for predicted vs. unpredicted outcomes, respectively).
The P3
The P3 amplitudes following predicted and unpredicted feedback
are presented in Table 1. Consistent with the impression sug-
gested by Figure 1, a 2 (Prediction)  2 (Outcome)  3 (Loca-
tion) repeated measures ANOVA conﬁrmed that the P3 became
larger at more parietal recording sites, F(2,32)5 4.89, po.05.
Additionally, the P3 was larger following unpredicted than pre-
dicted feedback, F(1,16)5 7.92, po.05, and larger for rewards
than nonrewards, F(1,16)5 15.87, po.001. The three-way in-
teraction and all two-way interactions failed to reach statistical
signiﬁcance (all ps4.20).
Discussion
The current experiment evaluated the effect of perceived reward
probability on feedback processing in a manner similar to that
reported by Hajcak et al. (2005). The current experiment ex-
tended the methodology of the Hajcak et al. study, however, by
asking participants to indicate whether or not they thought they
would receive a reward on a trial-by-trial basis. Thismodiﬁcation
controlled for possible inconsistencies between the objective
probabilities indicated by the predictive cues and the partici-
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Figure 1. ERPs elicited by predicted (left) and unpredicted (right)
rewarding and nonrewarding feedback, as well as the nonreward minus
reward difference waveform, at Fz (top), Cz (middle), and Pz (bottom)
from Experiment 1. Feedback onset occurred at 0 ms.
Table 1.Mean (M) and Standard Deviation (SD) for FN and P3
Magnitudes in Experiment 1 (Left) and Experiment 2 (Right)
Measure
Study 1 Study 2
Predicted Unpredicted Predicted Unpredicted
M SD M SD M SD M SD
FN
Fz  8.61 4.71  8.36 5.79  6.64 3.31  9.02 4.87
Cz  8.39 5.22  8.27 6.25  6.54 3.28  9.37 4.96
Pz  8.07 5.59  7.06 5.44  5.39 3.37  8.33 4.87
P3
Reward
Fz 12.51 5.21 13.00 6.27 7.51 4.48 11.14 6.45
Cz 15.66 6.36 16.72 8.31 12.94 5.33 17.72 7.57
Pz 15.47 6.77 16.22 8.84 16.88 5.84 20.78 7.97
Nonreward
Fz 8.97 4.21 11.26 5.05 7.61 5.91 9.33 4.79
Cz 11.13 4.91 13.31 5.40 11.29 6.75 14.81 6.57
Pz 11.23 5.47 13.17 5.20 14.60 5.96 17.78 6.45
1Even when the FN was evaluated at Cz, as in Holroyd et al. (2003),
prediction did not inﬂuence the magnitude of the FN, F(2,32)o1.
pants’ subjective expectations. In line with the retrospective re-
ports of the participants in the Hajcak et al. study, participants’
predictions in the present experiment were reliably modulated by
the predictive cue such that they predicted the most rewards on
3-cue trials and the fewest rewards on 1-cue trials. Thus, we were
able to build on our previous study in two important ways: (a)
We were able to provide a behavioral measure to verify that the
predictive cue induced appropriate expectations on a trial-by-
trial-basis and (b) we were able to compare directly predicted
versus unpredicted rewards and nonrewards as perceived by the
participants on each trial.
The results of the current study indicated that the feedback
negativity was not larger for unpredicted outcomes as perceived
by the participants on each trial. Further analyses of predicted
versus unpredicted feedback as a function of cue (i.e., predictions
on 2-cue trials versus those made on 1- and 3-cue trials) similarly
indicated that there was no effect of prediction on the feedback
negativity.
Interestingly, the results from the present study did conﬁrm
that subjective predictions differed substantially from objective
probability. That is, participants underestimated rewards some-
what on 1-cue trials, but demonstrated a positive bias on 2- and
3-cue trials, predicting rewards on approximately 74% and 95%
of trials, respectively. Overall, these data indicate that predictive
cues induced appropriate expectations overall, but that partic-
ipants’ predictions differed from objective probability in a num-
ber of cases.
In Experiment 1, participants were asked to make their pre-
dictions immediately after the predictive cue was presented but
prior to choosing a door. Therefore, their predictions were made
prior to their choice in the gambling task, but after having
knowledge about the likelihood of reward. Research on ‘‘magical
thinking’’Fwhereby individuals believe that their predictions
have some inﬂuence over a probabilistic outcomeFsuggests that
making predictions before actions might actually strengthen ex-
pectations (Rothbart & Snyder, 1970). Speciﬁcally participants
in the Rothbart and Snyder study were more conﬁdent in being
correct and wagered more money when predicting an outcome
before engaging in a probabilistic task (i.e., rolling dice). Thus,
we believed that this design would lead to high conﬁdence and
strong expectations about predicted rewards.
This design choice, however, was made on the assumption
that expectations induced by the cue would remain constant
throughout the duration of each trial. This might not have been
the case, however. Because participants had time to reconsider
their predictions at multiple time points during each trial, it is
possible that the strength of the prediction made after the cue
faded or even changed over the course of the trial. For instance,
participants could have felt conﬁdent that they would receive a
reward based on a cue (e.g., on a 3-cue trial), but changed their
expectations after their gambling choice. These possibilities are
consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) analysis of how
most individuals commit themselves to expect a range of possible
outcomes in a task rather than an exact probability estimate, and
given enough time to reconsider their predictions in the current
study, subjects might have had fairly weak (i.e., wide ranged)
expectations at the time of feedback presentation.
To explore these possibilities, participants in Experiment 2
performed a similar gambling task. In this case, however, sub-
jective predictions were made following responses and just prior
to the presentation of feedback.We hypothesized that this design
might strengthen expectations by having participants make re-
ward predictions just after their response and immediately before
receiving feedback. In this way, the time between prediction and
outcome was reduced, and this, in turn, would reduce the pos-
sibility that participants might second guess or change their pre-
dictions and thereby increase attention to the action–outcome
pairs. We again predicted that the feedback negativity should be
enhanced for unpredicted outcomes.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants
Seventeen different undergraduate students (15 women) in a
separate upper-level psychology class at the University of Del-
aware participated in the current experiment for extra credit. As
in Experiment 1, participants were told that they could earn be-
tween $0.00 and $24.00 in bonus money based on their perfor-
mance; all participants were paid $12.00.
Task and Procedure
The task and procedures and data analysis strategies for Exper-
iment 2 were identical to Experiment 1 except that the subjective
prediction questionF‘‘Do you think you will win on this tri-
al?’’Fwas presented after participants chose a door.
Results
Behavioral Results
Participants predicted a reward on 21.5% (SD5 18.4), 69.0%
(SD5 19.5), and 94.9% (SD5 6.9) of 1-, 2-, and 3-cue trials,
respectively. An ANOVA on number of predicted rewards at
each level of cue conﬁrmed that the cue inﬂuenced participants’
predictions, F(2,32)5 114.14, po.001. Post hoc analyses indi-
cated that participants predicted rewards on more 3-cue trials
than both 2-cue trials, t(16)5 6.98, po.001, and 1-cue trials,
t(16)5 15.27, po.001; additionally, rewards were predicted
more on 2- than 1-cue trials, t(16)5 7.91, po.001. Thus, the
behavioral data established that the predictive cue inﬂuenced
participants’ predictions regarding the subsequent feedback. As
in Experiment 1, participants exhibited a positive bias in their
predictions and predicted rewards on more than 50% and 75%
of 2- and 3-cue trials, respectively, t(16)5 4.02, po.001, and
t(16)5 11.89, po.001, respectively; however, participants did
not predict fewer than 25% of rewards on 1-cue trials,
t(16)5 .79, p4.40.2
The FN
Figure 2 presents feedback-locked ERP averages for rewarding
and nonrewarding feedback for predicted (left) and unpredicted
(right) outcomes at Fz, Cz, and Pz. As in Experiment 1, non-
rewarding feedback elicited a negative deﬂection approximately
300 ms following feedback onset. Figure 2 also presents the
difference wave obtained by subtracting rewards from nonre-
wards for predicted and unpredicted outcomes at each recording
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2To examine whether the percentage of predicted rewards varied be-
tween experiments, we conducted a 3 (Cue)  2 (Experiment) repeated
measures ANOVA on percent of predicted rewards for each type of cue.
Although the percentage of predicted rewards varied as a function of cue,
F(2,64)5 202.15, po.001, there was no effect of experiment, F(1,32)o1,
and Experiment did not interact with Cue, F(2,64)o1. Thus, subjective
probabilitieswere not affected bywhen participantsmade their prediction.
site, and Table 1 presents the average FN amplitudes at each
recording site. Unlike Experiment 1, however, the critical 3
(Electrode Site)  2 (Prediction) repeated measures ANOVA on
FN amplitude revealed that it was larger following unpredicted
outcomes, F(1,16)5 6.31, po.05. Although the FNwas larger at
frontal electrode sites, F(2,32)5 3.78, po.05, the interaction of
electrode site and prediction did not reach signiﬁcance,
F(2,32)o1.3
As in Experiment 1, we sought to determine whether predic-
tion strength modulated the effect of prediction on the FN and
compared the FN elicited by predicted and unpredicted feedback
on 2-cue trials (i.e., the weak prediction condition) with that on
1- and 3-cue trials (i.e., the strong prediction condition). Like
Experiment 1, this follow-up analysis was conducted on a sub-
sample of 11 participants who had at least 20 trials of each type in
the weak prediction condition. At Cz, where the FN was largest,
the FN did not differ as a function of prediction in this subset
of the data, F(1,10)o1. Critically, however, themain effect of pre-
diction strength, F(1,10)5 4.96, po.05, was qualiﬁed by an in-
teraction with prediction, F(1,10)5 6.07, po.05, indicating that
the FN did, indeed, differ as a function of prediction on strong
trials (M5  5.43, SD5 2.99 for predicted and M5  10.43,
SD5 4.80 for unpredicted outcomes), F(1,10)5 7.23, po.05,
but not weak trials (M5  10.88, SD5 6.61 for predicted and
M5  10.04, SD5 6.77 for unpredicted outcomes), F(1,10)o1.
Thus, the interaction between prediction and prediction strength
seems to be driven by the relatively small FN on predicted out-
comes when predictions are strong.
The P3
The average P3 amplitudes elicited by predicted and unpredicted
feedback are presented in Table 1. A 2 (Prediction)  3 (Out-
come)  3 (Electrode Site) repeated measures ANOVA indicat-
ed that the P3 was larger at more parietal recording sites,
F(2,32)5 35.31, po.001. The P3 was again larger following un-
predicted compared to predicted feedback, F(1,16)5 42.86,
po.001, and, like Experiment 1, the P3 was also larger follow-
ing rewards than following nonrewards, F(1,16)5 12.17, po.01.
Consistent with the depiction in Figure 2, the inﬂuence of out-
come (i.e., the FN) on the P3 was largest at parietal recording
sites, F(2,32)5 13.82, po.001. The three-way interaction and
other two-way interactions did not reach signiﬁcance (all
ps4.05).
Consistent with our FN results, which demonstrated an effect
of prediction strength in this experiment, an analysis of the P3 at
Pz, where it was largest, showed that the difference between un-
predicted and predicted feedback was larger in Experiment 2
(M5 3.53 mV, SD5 2.50) than Experiment 1 (M5 1.34 mV,
SD5 2.09), t(32)5 2.77, po.01.
General Discussion
The reinforcement learning theory holds that feedback negativity
amplitude is determined by an interaction between feedback va-
lence and expectedness, such that unexpected feedback induces
greater variance in feedback negativity amplitude relative to ex-
pected feedback. This prediction has been conﬁrmed in several
experiments (Gibson et al., 2006; Holroyd & Coles, 2002;
Nieuwenhuis, Nielen, et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002).
However, in a recent study we found that feedback negativity
amplitude appeared insensitive to the objective probability of
feedback in two gambling tasks (Hajcak et al., 2005). A possible
explanation for this discrepancy is that the overt probabilities in
these experiments only loosely corresponded to the participants’
actual expectations. Thus, if a person does not believe that trials
associated with 50% reward will in fact lead to reward half of the
time, then feedback negativity amplitude will not reﬂect a pre-
diction error associated with 50% reward. In the present study
we investigated this possibility by modifying the Hajcak et al.
task so that participants were queried about their subjective re-
ward prediction either before (Experiment 1) or after (Experi-
ment 2) their response. We found that feedback negativity
amplitude varied with subjective expectation only when predic-
tions were made following the response. Furthermore, this mod-
ulation of the feedback negativity was apparent when predictions
were presumably strongest (i.e., on 1- and 3-cue trials but not
2-cue trials). These results provide additional support for the
reinforcement learning theory but indicate that the methods for
inferring subjective expectancies should be carefully evaluated in
future experiments, and further, that participants’ expectancies
may have to be relatively strong and closely coupled with action-
outcome pairs to inﬂuence feedback negativity amplitude.
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Figure 2. ERPs elicited by predicted (left) and unpredicted (right)
rewarding and nonrewarding feedback, as well as the nonreward minus
reward difference waveform, at Fz (top), Cz (middle), and Pz (bottom)
from Experiment 2. Feedback onset occurred at 0 ms.
3Because the sample in Experiment 2 was comprised largely of wom-
en, we reanalyzed the data from Experiment 1 using gender (8 women, 9
men) as a between-groups variable to investigate whether gender might
explain the expectancy effect found in Experiment 2. Across all sites, and
at Fz only, there was no effect of prediction on the magnitude of the FN,
F(1,15)o1, the magnitude of the FN did not vary by gender, F(1,15)o1,
and the interaction between prediction and gender did not approach
signiﬁcance, F(1,15)o1. Thus, it is unlikely that the difference between
Experiments 1 and 2 was a function of the different gender distributions.
Why was feedback negativity amplitude associated with re-
ward expectancy only when the expectation was queried after the
response, but not before? Given the data at hand, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that participants’ predictions ﬂuctuated over
the course of each trial, solidifying only after participants were
committed to a response. Presumably, the process of action se-
lection involved an evaluation of the likelihood of each action–
outcome pair, followed by selection of the action with the highest
subjective expected value. The number of potential outcomes
would also have been smaller after the response (when there were
only two action–outcome possibilities), compared to before each
response (when then there were a total of eight action–outcome
possibilities). For these reasons, participants would have con-
fronted fewer possibilities, and would have evaluated these more
thoroughly, following each response relative to before it. Thus it
seems that participants would have been most conﬁdent in their
predictions at the end of each trial. Importantly, the P3 data are
consistent with this position: The effect of expectancy violation
on the P3 was more than twice as large in Experiment 2 as in
Experiment 1 (partial eta squared5 .72 vs. .33, respectively; see
also the Results section for Experiment 2). In contrast, partic-
ipants’ behavior did not differ between the two experiments (i.e.,
percentage of predicted rewards for each cue), suggesting that
when participants made their predictions did not alter their gam-
bling habits altogether, but rather changed how strongly they felt
about their chances. Given that we did not collect self-reported
conﬁdence on each trial, future studies will have to further eval-
uate this possibility.
Putting the current ﬁndings in the context of the reinforce-
ment learning theory and results of previous reinforcement
learning tasks, it appears that the feedback negativity is highly
sensitive to task demands that make the connections between
predictions and action–outcome pairsmore or less salient.We are
further examining this issue in a series of ongoing experiments
(Baker et al., 2006; Gibson et al., 2006; Lee, Krigolson, & Hol-
royd, 2006), and our preliminary results suggest that the role of
predictions depends on depth of processing: Participants appear
to make more concrete predictions in trial-and-error learning
tasks in which they are required to attend more deeply to the
relationship between feedback and behavior compared to gam-
bling or guessing tasks where the contingencies are less apparent.
Thus, reinforcement learning tasks seem to involve more ‘‘pas-
sive expectations’’ that are quite strong and built up through
experience whereas gambling tasks seem to involve more ‘‘con-
scious anticipations’’ that are more susceptible to doubt and re-
consideration (cf. Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). In other words,
the differences between reinforcement learning tasks and gam-
bling tasks might be understood in terms of the former relying on
more basic ‘‘bottom up’’ processes that might become strong and
automatic because of heightened attention and the latter relying
on more complex ‘‘top down’’ processes involving multiple eval-
uations and considerations of actions and outcome that are more
ﬂexible because of limited attentional capture by the task (cf.
Holroyd et al., 2006).
In this respect, it is interesting to note that Yeung et al. (2005)
found that the magnitude of the feedback negativity was smaller
in two gambling tasks that did not require overt responses.
Participants in this study rated the gambling tasks that involved
making overt responses as more interesting; additionally,
participants had larger self-reported affective responses to non-
rewarding versus rewarding outcomes during tasks that re-
quired a response, despite the fact that the objective value of
feedback was identical. Yeung et al. interpreted differences in the
feedback negativity between gambling tasks that require a re-
sponse and those that do not as reﬂecting differences in partic-
ipants’ level of interest. Alternatively, the present studies suggest
that (even implicit) reward predictions following responses
may explain the larger feedback negativity in tasks that require
a response.
We recognize that, by asking the participants to make a di-
chotomous prediction on each trial, the meaning of the feedback
is actually changed. For instance, participants would often have
correctly predicted negative feedback; in this way, the negative
feedback could simultaneously indicate that a participant’s pre-
diction was correct, and that he or she did not receive a reward.
Interestingly, the feedback negativity appeared to track the
monetary value of the feedback and was not related to its per-
formance-related aspect. This observation is consistent with a
recent study by Nieuwenhuis and colleagues, who found that the
feedback negativity could reﬂect either utilitarian- or perfor-
mance–related information conveyed by feedback, depending on
which aspect of the feedback is emphasized (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2004). These data suggest that the feedback negativity is not,
however, elicited simply by unpredicted outcomes (Oliveira,
2005)Fas even predicted outcomes elicited a feedback negativity
in both Experiments 1 and 2.
We have noted that the P3 was larger for unpredicted com-
pared to predicted feedback in Experiments 1 and 2. These data
are consistent with previous studies that have demonstrated sen-
sitivity of the P3 to expectancy violations (Courchesne et al.,
1977; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Johnson & Donchin,
1980). However, the P3 also was larger following rewards than
nonrewards in both Experiments 1 and 2, which might suggest
that the variance in amplitude of the feedback negativity in the
present study resulted from component overlap with the P3.
However, the opposite appears to be the case, as the variance in
P3 amplitude appears to have resulted from component overlap
with the feedback negativity. This conclusion holds because
feedback negativity amplitude (measured as a difference wave)
was frontal-centrally distributed for both Experiments 1 and 2: If
variance in the size of the difference wave resulted from an in-
crease in P3 amplitude across conditions, then the difference
wave would exhibit a posterior scalp distribution (Holroyd,
2004). Further, both the feedback negativity and P3 were larger
following unpredicted nonrewards in Experiment 2 relative to
Experiment 1; if just one component were driving both effects in
Experiment 2, one would expect a larger feedback negativity to
relate to a smaller P3, or vice versa. For these reasons we con-
clude that the changes in feedback negativity amplitude observed
in the present study did not result from component overlap with
the P3.
Overall, the present study provides further insight into elect-
rocortical activity related to processing rewards and nonrewards.
In particular, the feedback negativity was clearly sensitive to vi-
olations of reward prediction when a prediction was made fol-
lowing a response and immediately before receiving feedback in
the gambling task. These data suggest that themagnitude of error
signals are modulated by participants’ predictions, but that these
predictions solidify only after the participants have committed to
a particular action, perhaps because of increased attention to or
conﬁdence in the action–outcome associations. Future studies
can test this possibility, for example by asking participants about
their attention to or conﬁdence in their predictions in addition to
asking them about the predictions themselves.
Feedback and predictions 911
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